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Abstract 
According to US doctrine, command and control (C2) represents the most important military activity of 
all, and it recognizes people as the central element. Given the complementary importance of 
technology, however, it is insightful to view C2 in terms of socio-technical system design. In such 
context, it is important for any such design to balance its socio and technical subsystems. Unfortunately, 
the rapidly advancing technologies associated with autonomous systems are pulling C2 designs out of 
balance, particularly where autonomous agents, robots, unmanned vehicles and other machines are 
increasingly replacing people in organizations. This raises the important, open, research question of how 
socio-technical C2 systems should be (re)designed to (re)balance such rapid technological advance and 
broad proliferation of autonomous systems. Borrowing from success in engineering and the physical 
sciences, we seek to leverage known and well-understood principles to approach this design problem, 
and we draw specifically from Organization Design (OD) to address this open question. In particular, we 
build upon OD to characterize a principled, socio-technical system design method, the use and utility of 
which we illustrate through application to unmanned aircraft systems. 
Introduction 
According to US doctrine, command and control (C2) represents the most important military activity of 
all: “… no single activity in military operations is more important than C2. Alone, C2 will not destroy a 
single adversary target or affect a single emergency resupply. Yet, none of these essential joint force 
activities, or any others, would be possible without effective C2” (JP6-0 2006, I-1). Within this context, 
command is viewed broadly as “the authoritative act of making decisions and ordering action,” whereas 
control pertains to “the act of monitoring and influencing this action” (NDP6 1995, ii). Together, 
command and control enable people in an organization to understand “what needs to be done,” ensure 
“that appropriate actions are taken,” and conduct effective “planning, directing and controlling 
operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned” (JP6-0 2006, I-1). 
Much more than the computers, networks, satellites, radios, technical systems and other equipment 
used for communication and coordination, this same doctrine recognizes people as the central element 
of C2 (JP6-0 2006, I-1). Moreover, much more than the decisions and actions of some specific military 
commander, C2 is viewed best as a shared responsibility (Alberts & Hayes 2003, p. 14), a process with 
functions that must be carried out even when no one is “in charge” (e.g., multinational and multi-
organizational coalitions for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief [HADR]). Indeed, US doctrine 
recognizes such shared responsibility also, articulating how people, at all organizational levels, are 
central to C2: “Human beings—from the senior commander framing a strategic concept to a junior 
Service member calling in a situation report—are integral components of the C2 system and not merely 
users of it” (JP6-0 2006, I-1).  
Nonetheless, the people at every hierarchical level must be organized to accomplish (at least partially) 
shared goals (Scott 2003). Hence C2 is largely about organizing people—spanning all organizational 
levels and sometimes crossing myriad organizational boundaries—who coordinate efforts via 
organizational processes and leverage capabilities through technologies (Van Creveld 1985, p. 10). This 
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all suggests that C2 may be examined fruitfully as a teleological, socio-technical system, comprised of 
people, processes, organizations and technologies (Nissen 2011). 
As with most designed systems—including artificial ones (Simon 1999)—balance across system elements 
is important; whenever one element in a balanced design is changed, one or more other elements must 
change generally as well. A well-designed car being equipped with a huge new engine, for instance, will 
require substantial redesign (e.g., to suspension, structure, body, transmission, cabin) to maintain 
handling, structural integrity, aerodynamics, reliability, comfort and like, important performance 
characteristics. Likewise, even a well-designed C2 system being equipped with radical new technology, 
for instance, will require substantial redesign to maintain its important performance characteristics too. 
Today, the technologies associated with autonomous systems (e.g., “intelligent” agents, robots, 
unmanned vehicles) are changing very rapidly and dramatically, and such systems are proliferating 
broadly and deeply throughout military organizations. Much more than simply advanced tools and 
equipment to be used or operated by people in organizations, autonomous systems are increasingly 
replacing people and performing jobs and duties that have been reserved for humans from time 
immemorial.  
Moreover, this trend appears to be accelerating. As autonomous systems take on an ever increasing 
fraction of organizational work, their presence will pervade an ever increasing degree of organizational 
processes, and current trends suggest that C2 will be as much about commanding and controlling 
autonomous systems as people in organizations. Indeed, the limits experienced by autonomous systems 
in many organizations and mission-environmental contexts today are not technologically imposed; 
rather, such limits stem from organizational policies, procedures, perceived risks, ethical considerations, 
and like restrictions imposed by people, not technology. The people, processes and organizations 
associated with contemporary C2 are not keeping pace with technological change in the domain of 
autonomous systems, and the design balance is being lost. 
How should teleological, socio-technical C2 systems be (re)designed to (re)balance such rapid 
technological advance and broad proliferation of autonomous systems in order to maintain important 
performance characteristics? Should robots report to other robots in organizations? Should every C2 
organization involving autonomous systems reflect the same design? How will C2 organizations adjust to 
maintain the “best” designs across changes in their specific people, technologies and mission-
environmental contexts? These represent open research questions, which—given the fundamental role 
of C2—are taking on critical importance and urgency at present. All of the technological attention to and 
advance of autonomous systems in the world will not restore or preserve the important design balance 
necessary for C2 efficacy. Rather, given technological change as a driver, such balance will be principally 
in terms of the people, processes and organizations associated with agents, robots, unmanned vehicles, 
and other autonomous systems. 
One promising approach—borrowing from success in engineering and the physical sciences—is to 
leverage known and well-understood principles to approach a design problem. Of course principles from 
engineering and the physical sciences are much more precise and analytically tractable than are those 
pertaining to C2, but the C2 field is imbued with many principles, some dating back to the beginning of 
people organizing work together and including military endeavors. Indeed, the “problem of 
commanding and controlling armed forces … is as old as war itself” (Van Creveld 1985, 1). Many 
enduring principles have been induced through the study of C2 history, principles which can be 
integrated into coherent and useful models or theories (Alberts & Hayes, 2003; Builder et al. 1999; Van 
Creveld 1985). Further, many useful C2 principles are also being adapted from parallel fields (e.g., 
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Complex Adaptive Systems, Information Science, Organization and Management), and work to articulate 
metaphorical Rosetta Stones (Alberts & Nissen 2009) to translate promising techniques directly are 
being discovered and employed now. 
In this article we build upon well-understood principles from Organization Design (OD) to address the 
question of how a socio-technical C2 system can be redesigned to incorporate ever increasing 
technological change. We begin by characterizing OD in the context of socio-technical systems. Then we 
follow with close examination of a systematic organization design method, after which we illustrate the 
use and utility of this approach through application to unmanned aircraft systems.  
Background 
Organization Design centers on socio-technical knowledge developed through a large body of 
theoretical and empirical research over the past half century, and it interrelates very closely with C2 
(Nissen 2007). This is the case in particular where the mission-environmental context of C2 is changing 
and requires rebalancing: OD involves purposeful design and change of organizations to fit their 
missions, environments and other contingencies (e.g., strategies, technologies, people). Such purposeful 
design and change reflect a fundamentally rational, teleological view of organizing, a view which is 
ascribed widely to those involved with C2. Central to OD is the longstanding maxim that there is no 
single “best” way to organize across all contingencies (Burns & Stalker 1961, Woodward 1965, Lawrence 
& Lorsch 1967); rather, designs must be balanced and tailored to fit each contingency set (Donaldson 
2001).  
Moreover, the term organization refers to any collectivity of people with at least partially shared goals 
(Nissen 2007). This can range from individual families, bowling clubs and sole proprietorships (e.g., 
“mom and pop stores”) on the small side to the largest corporations, military forces and government 
agencies on the large side, in addition to organizations of organizations (e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, the United Nations, corporate supply chains and webs). Hence the term is quite broad and 
far, far more encompassing than the simple box and wiring diagrams used often to depict managerial 
areas of responsibility and reporting relationships (e.g., standard organization chart). 
Within this context of OD, we leverage the relatively recent “Rosetta Stone” by Alberts and Nissen 
(2009) to identify key variables and to interrelate them between OD and C2. For instance, the C2 
Approach Space (Alberts & Hayes 2006) identifies three principal dimensions useful for organizing C2: 
allocation of decision rights (ADR), patterns of interaction (POI) and distribution of information (DOI). By 
combining these three dimensions graphically, one can visualize a voluminous space of possible C2 
organization designs as depicted in Figure 1. 
For instance, the space includes two broad design classes of C2 organization: 1) Most Military 
Organizations, and 2) Edge Organizations. The former class is characterized by hierarchical organization, 
unity of command, centralized decision making, bureaucratic processes, and like aspects of most 
military organizations in practice today. In Approach Space terms, such organizations reflect negligible 
ADR from Commanders, limited POI across functional organizations, and limited DOI down or across 
hierarchical channels. The default C2 approach corresponding to this design class is termed De-
Confliction (SAS 2010). Leaders seek to prevent different organizations, units and elements from 
interfering with one another (e.g., via collisions, fratricide, contention for limited assets).  
Such de-confliction does not obtain always, however, and many circumstances find organizations in 
conflict with one another (esp. in multi-organization, joint, coalition and humanitarian operations). 
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Although Conflicted does not represent a C2 “approach” per se, we recognize it here to characterize the 
corresponding situation that is unfortunately common and potentially perilous. By analogy, most 
roadway systems utilize a de-confliction approach that separates cars travelling in different directions 
on opposite sides of the road. Roadway planners seek to prevent different cars from occupying the same 
roadway space at the same time (i.e., common roadway space-time), which is particularly important for 
avoiding head-on collisions. However, some circumstances find cars in conflict with one another, and it 
takes only a single car violating the de-confliction scheme (e.g., driving on the wrong side of the road, 
weaving back and forth across lanes, driving much faster or slower than other cars) to cause the entire 




















Figure 1 C2 Approach Space (Adapted from Alberts & Hayes, 2006) 
Alternatively, the latter design class (Alberts & Hayes 2003) is characterized instead by flat organization, 
emergent leadership, meritocracy, and self-synchronization. In Approach Space terms, such 
organizations reflect complete ADR from Commanders, extensive POI across functional organizations, 
and unlimited DOI down and across hierarchical channels. The corresponding C2 approach—termed 
Edge C2—is dramatically different than De-Confliction: it centers on self-organization and self-
synchronization, and it facilitates greater agility (Alberts & Hayes 2006). Notice that these two classes—
and their corresponding C2 approaches—are plotted at opposite corners of the Approach Space, 
signaling radically different C2 organization designs. Neither is universally “better” than the other: each 
has its own circumstances of best fit. Generally, C2 approaches closer to De-Conflicted tend to be quite 
stable, reliable, efficient and simple to coordinate—but they are very limited and rated at lower levels of 
C2 maturity (SAS 2010)—whereas those closer to Edge tend to offer greater inter-department, -unit or -
organizational synergies but involve much greater coordination costs—and they reflect higher maturity. 
Theoretically, a C2 organization can be designed anywhere within this approach space. For instance, 
some recent work on C2 co-evolution (Alberts et al. 2013) suggests that a main diagonal connecting 
these two design classes represents the most appropriate region for alternate C2 organizations. 
However, this suggestion effectively discounts the potential of off-diagonal designs (esp. for unusual 




The diagram above belies the immense size of the C2 Approach Space: unlike the relatively large cubic 
shapes used to depict these two organization classes, any specific C2 organization design would be 
represented more accurately as a point, and many different yet similar design points would fill the 
volume of Approach Space represented by any single design class. In other words, the class represents a 
large collection of similar design points. 
Of course we understand from above that different organization designs will be appropriate to fit 
different sets of mission-environmental contexts and like contingencies, and it is likely that only a 
relatively small subset of all possible design points will turn out to provide good contingent fit. The 
challenge of course is in searching through the relatively huge number of potential design points and 
identifying the comparatively tiny number of those providing good fit. As elaborated below, this 
represents a very challenging—and sometimes intractable—search problem, for which we turn to 
archetypical design. 
Archetypical Design 
We understand well how the use of archetypes can be effective in terms of reducing the kinds of 
otherwise intractable search spaces associated with design (Senge 1990). The heuristic classification 
approach, for instance, has been employed with great success via diagnostic artificial intelligence (AI) 
applications in medicine (e.g., MYCIN; see Shortliffe & Buchanan 1975), electronics (e.g., SOPHIE; see 
Brown et al. 1982), business (e.g., KOPeR; see Nissen 1998) and other, diverse domains. As such, the 
approach is quite general, and it offers good potential for application to C2 organization design. 










Figure 2 Heuristic Classification 
Figure 2 illustrates the approach. At the bottom-left we show a large problem space with M possible 
problems to be diagnosed. Depending upon the domain, such problems could pertain to human disease, 
electronic circuits, business issues or others, and the number of possible problems (e.g., mild to severe, 
individual or in combination, singular to recurring) that could potentially occur for a complex domain is 
immense. Hence we show the problem space as a large circle in the figure, and we denote the immense 
size of such space with a bold-capital “M.” Similarly at the bottom-right we show a corresponding 
solution space with N possible solutions to problems that could be diagnosed. Likewise the number of 
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possible solutions (e.g., poor to excellent fit, individual or in combination, short to long term) that could 
potentially exist for a complex domain is immense also. Hence we show the solution space as a large 
circle in the figure, and we denote the immense size of such space with a bold-capital “N.”  
Once a particular problem has been diagnosed—which is a very challenging search task in many complex 
domains—it represents a specific point within the problem space. We denote one such point with a 
comparatively tiny symbol “P1” in the figure. In design terms, this point P1 could represent a specific set 
of performance shortfalls and interacting constraints (e.g., technical, physical, economic, organizational, 
ethical). A particular solution to such specific problem lies somewhere as a point in the solution space, 
which must be found through search also. We denote one such point with an equivalently tiny symbol 
“S1” in the figure. In design terms, this point S1 could represent a particular configuration of system 
elements (e.g., computational, structural, financial, procedural, decisional) specified through design to 
address the specific problem P1. When attempting to diagnose problems (e.g., performance shortfalls 
and interacting constraints) and identify solutions (e.g., system design configurations), one is searching 
the combined spaces with a huge number (MxN) of possibilities. For complex domains, such search can 
be highly inefficient, ineffective or even infeasible within practical time and computational constraints. 
Alternatively, heuristic classification involves abstracting up from the immense problem space to a 
comparatively much, much smaller space of problem classes or archetypes. We denote the size of such 
space with a small “m” (m << M). A specific problem class or archetype (e.g., labeled “PC1” in the figure) 
represents more than just a single point: it represents a class or collection of many similar points, which 
is much easier to diagnose via search within a comparatively small space. Similarly with the space of 
solution classes or archetypes, the solution class space is much, much smaller than the solution space as 
a whole. We denote the size of such space with a small “n” (n << N); and a particular solution class or 
archetype (e.g., labeled “SC1” in the figure) is much easier to identify via search within a comparatively 
small space. In contrast to the huge number (MxN) of possibilities as above, the search problem 
becomes much easier (mxn). 
In our domain of C2 organization design, the problem and solution spaces are huge. Even when an 
organization’s problems have been diagnosed already (i.e., problem space search is complete), 
identifying the best-fitting organization design (i.e., via solution space search) remains a daunting task. 
Drawing from Burton et al. (2006), for instance, conservatively a quarter-billion2 unique design points 
(i.e., solutions) can be identified even for a relatively small, common and well-understood subset of 
organization problems. Instead of searching such a large space directly (e.g., evaluating a quarter-billion 
different design alternatives), we seek to identify an organization class or archetype that meets the 
design objectives generally. Then we refine the design to fit the specific organization under examination 
(Nissen 1997). We refer to this approach as archetypical organization design, and we draw initially from 
Mintzberg (1979) and then Alberts and Nissen (2009) to articulate the approach. 
Organization Archetypes 
Mintzberg (1979) proposes that almost all organizations can be described by only five3 organization 
archetypes: 1) Machine Bureaucracy, 2) Simple Structure, 3) Professional Bureaucracy, 4) Divisionalized 
Form4 and 5) Adhocracy. Alberts and Nissen (2009) also discuss the No Organization “archetype,” which 
                                                            
2 Based upon 14 organization design factors each with 4 alternate values: 414 = 268,435,456; this number of 
alternate values is very conservative. 
3 In later work Mintzberg expands the set to include a couple of additional archetypes. 
4 We ignore the Divisionalized Form here, for it is simply a collection of other archetypes. 
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involves collections of independent people or organizations pursuing at least partially shared goals 
without organization structure or coordination mechanism. Each archetype can be characterized in 
terms of five organizational elements: 1) strategic apex, 2) middle line, 3) operating core, 4) 
technostructure and 5) support staff. Each archetype can be characterized also in terms of five 
coordination mechanisms: 1) mutual adjustment, 2) direct supervision, and standardization of 3) work 
processes, 4) outputs and 5) skills.  
Drawing heavily from Nissen (2005), Figure 3 summarizes these organizational elements in the upper-
left quadrant. The strategic apex is shown as a circle at the top of the organization. This is where 
strategic organization, management and leadership are accomplished in most views of organizing. The 
middle line is shown as a square below the apex. This is where line organization, management and 
leadership take place, often through functional departments or like approaches to division of labor. The 
operating core is shown immediately below the middle. This is where the basic product and service 
outputs of the organization are accomplished. On either side of the middle line is the technostructure 
and support staff. Like the middle line, these two elements both sit between the strategic apex and the 
operating core, but as staff organizations they are not part of the direct line between the apex and core. 
The technostructure is responsible for direct support such as planning, analysis and technology. The 












Figure 3 Organizational Elements and Coordination Mechanisms (Adapted from Nissen 2005)  
Using these elements arranged as such, different organization archetypes can be depicted and 
differentiated analytically and graphically. For instance, the Machine Bureaucracy (labeled “Machine: 
work std”) is depicted in the lower-left quadrant. It includes all five elements, with three elements 
emphasized in terms of large prominence. Specifically, the middle line is depicted using a relatively large 
square, and both the technostructure and support staff are depicted similarly using relatively large 
circles. This depiction represents the relatively many layers of middle management and relatively large 
size and influence of technical and support staffs. Coordination is attained largely through 
standardization of work processes (e.g., standard operating procedures [SOPs]). We include several 
vertical lines in most of the elements to represent the manner in which people are organized often via 
functional departments, where authority, communication, work and information flow vertically via 
“stovepipes,” and where people are highly specialized in the jobs that they perform. Most large firms, 
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military commands and government agencies organize along these lines, and the C2 term Hierarchy 
corresponds very closely with this Machine Bureaucracy archetype (Nissen 2005). The Machine 
Bureaucracy fits well with relatively complex tasks and environments that are stable and predictable, 
particularly where output reliability and coordination efficiency represent driving concerns. 
Alternatively, this form does not change rapidly or perform novel tasks well, as the organization resists 
change even when it is desired by the apex and necessary for survival. It does not fit well with 
environments that are dynamic and unpredictable or where extensive cross-functional interaction is 






Figure 4 Edge Organization (Adapted from Nissen 2005) 
In contrast, the Simple Structure (labeled “Simple: direct supervision”) is depicted in the upper-right 
quadrant. It includes only two of the five elements: 1) strategic apex, and 2) operating core. The 
strategic apex is emphasized in terms of large prominence, and coordination is attained principally 
through direct supervision (e.g., giving orders), often to a pool of people who are largely unspecialized in 
the breadth of jobs that they perform. Most small businesses are organized as such. The Simple 
Structure fits well with relatively simple environments and small numbers of people. It can adjust very 
quickly to goal shifts and other changes from the strategic apex, and this archetype is appropriate where 
coordination cost and simplicity represent key concerns. Alternatively, this archetype is not suited well 
for complex tasks and environments, nor does it scale well: the organization can break down and fail 
quickly when it becomes too large for a single person or small staff to manage effectively from the apex. 
The Professional Bureaucracy (labeled “Professional: skills std”) is depicted in the lower-right quadrant. 
It includes all five elements also, but both the operating core and support staff are emphasized in terms 
of large prominence. Here standardization of skills provides the principal means of coordination among 
professionals in the operating core (e.g., professional certifications). We include a few vertical lines in 
the operating core element to represent the manner in which professionals specialize in distinct areas of 
expertise: people share common backgrounds (e.g., medicine, engineering, consulting) but pursue 
unique specializations (e.g., Gynecology, Oncology, Hematology). Most professional corporations (e.g., 
legal firms, medical offices, consultancies) organize in these terms. The Professional Bureaucracy fits 
well with environments requiring deep technical expertise and specialization. It can address exceedingly 
difficult problems within a particular area of expertise, and this archetype is appropriate where efficacy 
is a central concern. Alternatively, it does not respond well to changes driven from the apex—the 
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herding cats metaphor is apt with this organization archetype—and extensive cross-functional 
interaction across specialties can be a challenge.  
Table 1 Organization Archetypes – Comparative Fit 
Archetype Good Fit Poor Fit 
Machine  
Bureaucracy 
Complex tasks required 
Stable & predictable environments 
Reliability & efficiency concerns 
Quick change & novel tasks required 




Simple environments & few people 
Quick change required 
Cost & simplicity concerns 
Complex tasks & environments 
Does not scale well 
Professional 
Bureaucracy 
Deep technical expertise required 
Highly difficult problems 
Efficacy concerns 
Quick change required 
Cross-functional interaction 
Adhocracy Dynamic & unpredictable 
environments 
Quick change & novel tasks required 
Cross-functional interaction 
Reliability & efficiency concerns 
Control important 
Edge Same as Adhocracy 
Unfamiliar people & no one in charge 
Same as Adhocracy 
Risk concerns 
 
The Adhocracy (labeled “Adhocracy: adjustment”) is depicted in the center. It includes all five elements 
also, but they are blended together to delineate much less structure and differentiation than is present 
in the other archetypes. Here mutual adjustment provides the principal means of coordination among 
people in all areas of the organization (e.g., close interaction, often of an unscripted or non-procedural 
nature), and although people may be quite specialized individually in the jobs that they perform, 
extensive interaction across functions and specialties is involved generally. Many new firms, agencies 
and organizations (e.g., business startups, innovative companies, non-profit groups) reflect the loosely 
structured Adhocracy. The Adhocracy fits well with dynamic and unpredictable environments, 
particularly those that require rapid reconfiguration and adjustment to novel tasks, and where cross-
functional interaction is essential. Alternatively, outputs can suffer in terms of reliability; this 
organization archetype is notably inefficient (yet potentially uniquely effective) due to high coordination 
costs; and organization leaders may sense a loss of control. 
 
It is important to understand that these organizational elements and coordination mechanisms can be 
put together in many different manners and that they can change dynamically. For instance, the Edge 
organization (Alberts & Hayes 2003) integrates aspects of multiple archetypes. Like the Simple Structure, 
it reflects low specialization; like the Professional Bureaucracy, it reflects a prominent operating core; 
and like the Adhocracy, it involves coordination via mutual adjustment; but it lacks the other 
organizational elements. Indeed, the Edge can be viewed as a hybrid archetype, yet it is distinct (Gateau 
et al. 2007, Orr & Nissen 2006) in that only an operating core is involved. Leadership is emergent in the 
Edge meritocracy environment, which we depict by different dotted circles (e.g., corresponding to 
different leaders emerging at various times) extending only partially from the operating core in Figure 4. 
This figure includes the three archetypes from which it draws also. The Edge provides good fit in the 
same situations noted for the Adhocracy above, and it can be uniquely effective in circumstances where 
people or organizations share some common goals (e.g., humanitarian assistance) but are unfamiliar 
with one another and no one is in charge. Alternatively, it suffers from the same limitations as the 
Adhocracy, and the Edge raises large concerns in terms of risk stemming from mistakes. Table 1 
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summarizes these five organization archetypes in terms of circumstances corresponding to their 
comparatively good and poor fit. 
 
Additionally, Mintzberg introduces ten OD variables associated with organization design—what he terms 
design factors—to specify and contrast the archetypes in considerable detail. Such variables enable us to 
get more precise in terms of specifying the different archetype (and point) designs. Experience suggests 
that all ten factors will play a role in any organization redesign (e.g., to restore balance). 
 
Table 2 summarizes the archetype variables. Centralization pertains to the breadth of decision rights. 
Specialization refers to the division of labor and includes two dimensions: vertical refers to the extent of 
job control; horizontal refers to the breadth of job duties. Formalization represents the extent to which 
work processes are specified formally (e.g., via rules, policy manuals, written procedures, job 
instructions). Liaison devices involve means of horizontal interaction (esp. across different functions, 
specialties and organizations); this can include approaches such as informal exchanges, liaisons, task 
teams and matrix organizations. Planning and control refers to how outputs are managed; this can be by 
(advance) action planning or (ongoing) performance control.  
 
Table 2 Archetype Variables (Adapted from Alberts & Nissen 2009) 
Design Factor Meaning 




Limitedness of job control  
Horizontal specialization  
 
Narrowness of job breadth 
Formalization 
 
Formalization of work processes 
Liaison devices 
 
Means of horizontal interaction 
Planning & control 
 
Management of outputs 
Training  
 
Formal education & training 
Indoctrination 
 
Intensity of acculturation & norming 
Unit grouping 
 
Composition of organization units 
Unit size 
 
Span of control 
  
 
Training involves the degree of formal education of and training provided to organizational participants, 
usually in advance of beginning a job. Indoctrination involves the intensity of acculturation and norming 
forces associated with an organization. Unit grouping refers to how organizational units are composed; 
this is most commonly by function (e.g., skill, knowledge, business process) or market (e.g., product, 
geography, demographic). Finally, unit size refers to managerial span of control. With this set of ten 
design factors, we have the ability to characterize a broad diversity of organization archetypes and 
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specific design points, and we have a set of variables to both specify and contrast them analytically and 
graphically.  
 
Indeed, using the concepts and variables from above, we can specify each of the five organization 
archetypes discussed above (i.e., Machine Bureaucracy, Simple Structure, Professional Bureaucracy, 
Adhocracy, Edge). This provides a vivid example of reduced solution space size: a solution space with 
over a quarter-billion alternate design points can be condensed to only five OD archetypes (i.e., that can 
be counted on one hand). 
 
Table 3 summarizes design specifications for each of the five archetypes. The first column refers to six of 
the most relevant design factors summarized in Table 2 above. The other five columns reflect OD 
variable values for each archetype. For instance, Column 2 summarizes specification of the Machine 
Bureaucracy in terms of this variable set, which reflects high centralization, specialization and 
formalization levels. The other variables and levels follow accordingly for the Machine Bureaucracy and 
counterpart archetypes. In addition to relatively extreme labels (esp. “High” and “Low”), we include 
some intermediate values (e.g., “Some” and “Little”) to suggest that not all archetypes and variables 
reflect such extremes. At this point in our conceptual development, archetypical design specifications 
remain limited to such use of ordinal scales. We leave to future research the continued refinement to 
develop ratio measures. 








Centralization High High Low Low Low
Vertical 
specialization High High Low Low Low
Horizontal 
specialization High Low High High Low
Formalization High Low Low Low Low
Liaison 










Alberts and Nissen (2009) build upon this work to integrate OD and the C2 Approach Space. Specifically, 
each of the organization archetypes and design factors is mapped to corresponding C2 approach space 
elements through what they refer to as a metaphorical “Rosetta Stone” (p. 39) that interrelates OD-C2 




Table 4 Mapping Variables across Domains (Adapted from Alberts & Nissen 2009) 
C2 Dimension OD Variable 
Allocation of Decision Rights (ADR)  Centralization  
Vertical Specialization  
Horizontal Specialization  
  
Patterns of Interaction (POI) Formalization  
Liaison Devices  
Planning & Control Systems  
  
Distribution of Information (DOI) Liaison Devices  
Planning & Control Systems  
 
Table 4 summarizes this interrelating. Within the C2 column we have the now familiar ADR, POI and DOI 
dimensions, with corresponding OD variables in the next column. For instance, the C2 Approach Space 
dimension ADR corresponds best with three OD variables: centralization, vertical specialization and 
horizontal specialization. The same applies to the other two C2 dimensions. Notice some overlap of OD 
variables across the POI and DOI dimensions; this suggests that such dimensions are not orthogonal, and 
indeed they appear to be somewhat related (Alberts & Hayes 2006). The interested reader can refer to 
Alberts and Nissen (2009) for details. Notice that not all of the OD variables from Table 2 are included. 
Only a subset of the OD variables is required for mapping to the C2 Approach Space; this suggests that 
the C2 Approach Space offers potential for further dimensional expansion. 
Table 5 C2-OD Archetype: Detail Specification (Adapted from Alberts & Nissen 2009) 
 
Table 5 maps these C2 approach dimensions to corresponding OD variables and organization archetypes 
according to this scheme. Looking at the Machine Bureaucracy archetype, for instance, we have high 
centralization, vertical specialization and horizontal specialization: together, these three high levels 
suggest unitary ADR. Likewise for POI: high formalization, few liaison devices and focus on action 
planning suggest constrained interaction patterns. Similarly for DOI: few liaison devices and focus on 
action planning suggest controlled information distribution. The same kind of reasoning applies to OD 







Centralization High High Low Low Low
Vertical 
specialization High High Low Low Low
Horizontal 
specialization
High Low High High Low
Formalization High Low Low Low Low
Liaison Devices Few Few Some Many Many
Planning & Control 
Systems
Action planning Little Little Some action
Performance 
control
Liaison Devices Few Few Some Many Many
Planning & Control 
Systems










specification of the other four archetypes. Notice the considerable contrast between Machine 
Bureaucracy and Edge; this is consistent with prior research in both C2 (Alberts & Hayes 2006) and OD 
(Nissen 2005). 
Table 6 condenses this specification into the three dimensions comprising the C2 Approach Space, and it 
identifies the principal C2 approaches corresponding to each organization archetype. The Machine 
Bureaucracy, for instance, is specified as Unitary ADR, Constrained POI and Controlled DOI. At the 
bottom of Table 6 we also highlight De-Conflicted in bold font as the primary C2 approach employed by 
the Machine Bureaucracy. We note Coordination as a secondary approach here also. The other four 
organization archetypes are specified similarly and related to their primary and secondary C2 
approaches in like manner. 
Table 6 C2-OD Archetype: Condensed Specifications and C2 Approaches  
 
Figure 5 shows each of the five archetypes positioned within the C2 Approach Space. As a point of 
reference, Machine Bureaucracy is plotted in the lower-left-front area of the diagram, reflecting unitary 
ADR, constrained POI, and controlled DOI; the primary C2 approach De-Conflicted is shown in the figure, 
and we delineate some overlap with Coordinated also. The other organization archetypes are plotted 
similarly, and aside from the Edge archetype, they reflect overlapping C2 approaches too. As depicted 
here and discussed above, in contrast, the Edge organization archetype corresponds solely with the 
Edge C2 approach. This provides us with visual representation of alternate organization archetypes and 
how they relate to different C2 approaches. For simplicity and clarity of illustration, each of the five 
organization archetypes is delineated by a box shape of roughly the same size, and all five box regions 
are plotted along a main diagonal of the Approach Space. We leave for future research the more precise 








Unitary Mostly unitary Mostly P2P Mostly P2P P2P
Constrained Partially constrained Balanced Mostly unconstrained Unconstrained




























EG: Edge  
Figure 5 OD Archetypes in C2 Approach Space (Adapted from Alberts & Nissen 2009)  
 
Archetypical Organization (Re)Design Summary 
The first step in terms of archetypical organization (re)design is to recognize one’s current 
circumstances. Because very few of us have an occasion to design a whole new organization from a 
metaphorical blank sheet of paper, we emphasize redesign here; hence the first step is to understand 
one’s current organization archetype—and corresponding C2 approach—then to assess its contingency 
fit. The discussion of organization archetypes, elements and design factors can guide this step, and the 
summary presented in Table 1 above is central to diagnosing current problems at the class level. Most 
people in military, government or large corporate organizations, for instance, will find themselves in the 
Machine Bureaucracy archetype and employing De-Conflicted C2.  
Presuming5 that one or more problems with the contingency fit are identified—again, at the class 
level—the second step is to identify the organization archetype that provides the best fit with either the 
current or anticipated contingency context, and as above, Table 1 above is central to identifying the best 
fitting archetype. Many people in military, government or large corporate organizations, for instance, 
will find themselves interested in more rapid organizational change (esp. to rebalance with technological 
advance), the ability to perform novel tasks (e.g., pertaining to relatively unfamiliar or unpracticed 
missions), agility in dynamic and unpredictable environments (e.g., not being inhibited by one’s own 
rigid organization structure and processes), and increased cross-functional and interorganizational 
interactions (esp. where multiple functions and organizations are required to work together), potentially 
with unfamiliar organizational partners (e.g., that do not participate in common training exercises), and 
occasionally where no one person or organization is in charge (e.g., HADR).  
Step three involves examining the organization design factors and associated C2 approaches that 
correspond with the archetype identified in Step 2. Organizational leaders must then compare such 
factors and approaches with those corresponding with the current organization design (i.e., compare 
                                                            




the “to be” design factors and C2 approaches with their “as is” counterparts). When a list of changes has 
been formulated and finalized, the organization can refine the archetypical design to suit its specific 
needs and idiosyncrasies in Step 4. This completes the organization design activity.  
Leaders then initiate a program of organizational change in Step 5 to transition from one design point to 
another. Of course this succinct summary belies the considerable challenge inherent in the details. The 
four organization design steps are largely analytical and can be accomplished principally in the strategic 
apex and technostructure. Step 5 involves organizational change, in contrast, which must permeate 
through the middle line and operating core. This is a notably difficult undertaking in all but the smallest 
and simplest organizations and environments. We include this fifth step for reference in Table 7 
nonetheless. Note that this process is ongoing; sharing some similarities with the OODA Loop6, one 
repeats these steps with each new mission, environment, technology, and like change that can push the 
socio-technical C2 system out of balance. 
Table 7 Summary – Archetypical OD Process 
Step Activity 
1 Understand current organization and assess contingency fit (“as is”) 
2 Identify the organization archetype that provides the best fit (“to be”) 
3 Compare organization design factors and associated C2 approaches 
4 Refine archetypical design to suit specific needs and idiosyncrasies 
5 Initiate program of organizational change (“as is”  “to be”) 
 
Autonomy C2 Application 
In this section we illustrate the use and utility of the archetypical OD approach through application to 
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). We begin by outlining two, contrasting use cases in the context of 
maritime interdiction operations (MIO): 1) a single, organically operated unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 
in sparse, locally controlled airspace; and 2) a large number of manned and unmanned aircraft operated 
by non-allied nations in dense, uncontrolled airspace. 
Case 1 – single organic UAV in sparse, locally controlled airspace 
In this first case, consider a US Navy vessel operating somewhat independently at sea to conduct anti-
piracy operations. The vessel and crew are clearly part of an established US Military organization and 
command structure (e.g., fleet, task force, combatant command), but it is operating with minimal 
contact, oversight or interaction. The ship’s crew relies heavily upon intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR) to locate piracy suspects, and it utilizes the visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) 
process when such suspects are found. These processes have become very routine, formal and 
procedural, and where manned aircraft are employed to extend ISR, the operational airspace is 
controlled locally (when possible) through planning associated with the Air Tasking Order (ATO). Say that 
the C2 organization—with respect to ISR, VBSS and the ATO—is in good balance. This does not imply 
                                                            
6 Observe; Orient; Decide; Act; see Boyd. 
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that the organization is “optimal7,” “effective,” “efficient” or beyond the need for redesign; rather, the 
various system elements (i.e., people, process, organization, technology) are in balance with one 
another. 
Now we introduce an organic Scan Eagle for remote ISR and VBSS support. Like many UAS today, Scan 
Eagle operations involve people with different skills (e.g., Air Vehicle Operator, Mission Payload 
Operator, Mission Coordinator), involve unique processes (e.g., shipboard UAV launch and recovery, 
remote control), and can insert contractor personnel and like non-military organizations into the C2 
socio-technical system (C3F 2012), in addition to unique technological implications (e.g., UAVs lacking 
the ability to sense and avoid other aircraft in flight). This UAS technology introduction can tip the C2 
organization out of balance (e.g., requiring new SOPs, tactics, processes, training, communication 
patterns, reporting relationships), particularly where the crew begins relying upon the UAS and using it 
in lieu of manned aircraft support to some missions. 
Following the five steps summarized above, we begin by recognizing the current organization as a 
Machine Bureaucracy typical of Navy ships and crews. One could make the case for the organization 
within this specific ship reflecting many aspects of Simple Structure (esp. stemming from the extensive 
use of direct supervision for coordination), but the high degrees of centralization, specialization, 
formalization and departmentalization suggest that the Machine Bureaucracy archetype provides a 
better characterization.  
The C2 approach associated most generally with such machine archetype is De-Conflicted, which 
matches the approach in current use. Indeed, according to the ATO, various (manned, and now 
unmanned) aircraft perform their missions generally at different times and/or in different operational 
areas. The organization controls its local airspace and works to determine via advance planning—except 
in emergent situations—which aircraft will fly where and when; the plan helps to ensure that multiple 
aircraft do not encounter airspace-time conflicts with one another.  
In terms of the C2 Approach Space delineated in Figure 6, unitary decision rights are fixed within the 
strategic apex and middle line (i.e., low ADR), and different aircraft operating units are constrained 
generally so as to not share common airspace-time (i.e., low POI). These characteristics correspond well 
to the Machine Bureaucracy archetype. The DOI, however, reflects greater balance yet remains mostly 
controlled. Data analyzed within intelligence centers are disseminated Fleet-wide via Common 
Operational Picture or Recognized Maritime Picture, but future aircraft operational information is 
mostly controlled through ATO distribution, and current operational information associated with each 
aircraft (e.g., specific geographical location and velocity, sensor feeds, in-flight decisions) remains 
comparatively local. These characteristics correspond more closely with the Simple Structure archetype. 
As plotted within the C2 Approach Space here, the corresponding “Case 1 OD” point plots well at the 
outside corner of the Machine Bureaucracy archetype (“MB”), reflecting some overlap with the Simple 
Structure (“SS”), and it sits within the De-Conflicted C2 approach band shown in the figure.  
 
                                                            
7 We place these terms in quotation marks to indicate that socio-technical systems can be difficult to assess with 
precision and reliability. This also suggests that nearly every organization has room for some improvement; the 

























Figure 6 UAS C2 OD 
The next step involves understanding the need for change and identifying the best fitting archetype for 
preserving or restoring socio-technical balance8 to the C2 organization. In this first use case, it’s unclear 
why the organization as configured would require change at the archetype level. With the ATO in place 
to prevent airspace-time conflicts, and the vessel operating only a single Scan Eagle, the C2 organization 
appears as though it can integrate the new UAS personnel and skills (e.g., within the Operations 
Department onboard ship; this could integrate in turn into the JAOC and JFACC9 organizations when the 
vessel rejoins its task force), modify processes (e.g., fly only one manned or unmanned aircraft at a time 
in a particular region of airspace), create new positions (e.g., Mission Coordinator to interface between 
UAS and ship personnel), and make like, relatively minor changes to accommodate UAS operations 
without affecting C2 organization in a major way. Moreover, the organizational environment is relatively 
stable and predictable; operational reliability is a key concern; and UAS integration does not affect 
cross-functional interaction extensively. Provided that organizational leaders are content with De-
Conflicted C2 (i.e., efficient and simple to coordinate but not agile or synergy promoting), we see no 
need for archetypical redesign in this case. Our message to the organizational leaders and managers: 
carry on—until the next new mission, environment, technology, or like change that can push the socio-
technical C2 system out of balance comes along. 
Case 2 – many non-allied UAVs in dense, uncontrolled airspace 
In this second case, consider the same US Navy vessel, crew, Scan Eagle and VBSS support role noted 
above. Consider further that this vessel is operating now as part of a task force (e.g. Joint Task Force or 
Coalition Task Force) or like, multi-unit, hierarchical organization. Additionally, consider that there are 
other, non-allied vessels (e.g., from a variety of different nations) conducting anti-piracy operations in 
proximity to the task force. However, these foreign ships may not all be willing “partners” to the joint or 
coalition task force structure. Indeed, in some cases they may be unable—even if willing—to operate as 
part of a unified coalition or like approach suggesting common or predetermined command structure, 
operating procedures and information exchange across organizations. Moreover, several of the 
                                                            
8 At this point we lack a good metric for balance. This represents a fruitful research topic. 
9 JAOC: Joint Air Operations Center; JFACC: Joint Force Air Component Commander 
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participants may even be inherently mistrustful of one another (e.g., consider American, Chinese and 
Russian ships operating in a common area; imagine Iranian, North Korean and Somalian mercenary ships 
joining in; how about extraterrestrials and pre-apocalyptic Zombies?) and lack prior cooperative training 
or experience. 
Additionally, say that most participating organizations operate their own organic aircraft, manned and 
unmanned alike, and that there is no process for integrated planning of ATOs across the diverse 
participant organizations. Nonetheless, these organizations are all working toward a partially shared set 
of goals (esp. anti-piracy, non-escalation of tension between international participants, safe maneuver), 
and they all value the ISR and VBSS support capabilities of their UAVs. Say further that the ships all tend 
to swarm toward areas where acts of piracy are common, suspected or reported—in which case the 
airspace could be dense with a large number of manned and unmanned aircraft—and there are no 
established or customary means to deconflict UAS operations across all organizations.  
As above, Step 1 starts by recognizing the current organization as a Machine Bureaucracy within the US 
Navy vessel and joint/coalition task force. However, as we extend our analysis across the multiple anti-
piracy participants operating in a common area, they are all very clearly not part of a common machine 
or like organization. Without some means of organizing across the various participants—and despite the 
joint/coalition ATO process—the de-facto C2 approach defaults to Conflicted in this case, and no 
apparent organization is in place across all participants (i.e., the “archetype” No Organization). Not only 
do we observe the same, UAS-driven design issue discussed above, the lack of multiparticipant 
organization renders C2 pertaining to operations in dense airspace relatively ineffective and potentially 
dangerous. Moreover, the kinds of relatively minor organizational adjustments noted above appear to 
be inadequate here, and the associated search space appears to be huge. Archetypical OD seems 
appropriate in this second use case. 
Indeed, Step 2 suggests that one begin by examining the contingencies in place and identifying the best 
fitting organization archetype. Even from the short description above, quick change will likely be 
required to work effectively with the other anti-piracy participants; the corresponding multi-
organization environment is likely to remain relatively dynamic and unpredictable so long as multiple 
participants’ ships and planes co-operate in common areas; and cross-organizational interaction seems 
essential. Referring back to Table 1, these are all considerations suggesting that a typical military 
Machine Bureaucracy—even if feasible—would not represent a good fit. Nor would a Simple Structure 
(e.g., due to the complex task environment and large number of people involved) or Professional 
Bureaucracy (e.g., due to requirements for quick change and cross-organizational interaction) appear to 
fit well. 
Alternatively, both the Adhocracy and Edge archetypes offer potential for good fit in these same 
respects (i.e., they fit well in circumstances where these other archetypes do not), but they present their 
own set of issues (esp. concerns with reliability, control and risk). Regardless of such issues, it is 
relatively clear that no one is in charge of the multi-organization collective. Hence the archetypical 
choice reduces to Edge organization or no organization at all; this corresponds to a choice between Edge 
C2—which implies considerable C2 maturity and agility—and Conflicted C2. We note this choice as 
“Case 2E” (Edge Organization, Edge C2) and “Case 2N” (No Organization, Conflicted C2), respectively, in 
Figure 6.  
In the former case of Edge organization, we plot the design very near the Adhocracy archetype, 
suggesting that US Navy leadership may wish to limit ADR, POI and DOI as much as would remain 
consistent with Edge C2 (e.g., self-organization and self-synchronization). In the latter case of no 
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organization, notice the positioning of this organization design at the bottom-right-front corner of the 
C2 Approach Space diagram. This suggests complete ADR (e.g., non-allied participants can do whatever 
they please) and no POI or DOI (i.e., no deliberate interaction or sharing with all participants). 
Presuming that Edge represents the better choice, this completes Step 2 of the archetypical OD process.  
It is important to understand the focus of this choice, however. We are not expecting all of the 
multinational participants to abandon their internal organizations and move in whole to the Edge. There 
is probably insufficient trust, knowledge and learning capability (or desire) to enable the Edge as a 
whole. Alternatively, if we focus this analysis solely on C2 organization pertaining to manned and 
unmanned aircraft, then it becomes a more feasible, understandable and practical approach, one which 
is presumed in the remainder of our discussion. 
Step 3 entails examining the OD factors and associated C2 approaches. The change required for the US 
Navy vessel and task force is to transition from its Machine Bureaucracy organization internally (i.e., 
within the ships and task force) and enable Edge organization externally (i.e., across multinational ships 
and organizations)—again, with respect to UAS C2 organization. The de-facto ADR is complete already 
(i.e., no one organization asserts control over another’s assets), but it is important for the organizational 
leaders to understand the implications. In particular, the high levels of centralization, vertical and 
horizontal specialization in force within the task force organization would give way to lower levels across 
the non-allied participants’ organizations. Centralized command, control and communication would 
continue within the task force of course (e.g., Skippers would communicate with commanders and 
counterpart Skippers), but Lieutenants, Chiefs, UAV operators and others within the task force 
organization may begin making UAS-related decisions and communicating directly with their 
counterparts on non-allied ships. Such added decision making would decrease the vertical specialization 
associated with these people, and the corresponding cross-organizational interface activities would 
reduce horizontal specialization also. As summarized in Table 1, leaders across all organizations will 
likely have concerns regarding reliability of operations, risk of mistakes, and loss of control (esp. 
regarding the airspace-time), but no one is in charge, and the alternative is no organization. If other 
participating organizations are flying UAVs in the airspace-time on a local organization’s ATO plan, for 
instance, then one could consider just accepting that the other organization’s UAVs got there first and 
asking for them to share sensor feeds (and offer to reciprocate of course). This reflects a more Edge-like 
(and agile yet perhaps uncomfortable) C2 approach. 
The same thought process applies to the POI and DOI dimensions. In particular, recall that formalization, 
liaison devices and planning and control systems represent the key OD variables influencing POI. For 
unconstrained POI—and again, with respect to UAS C2 organization—a shift from few to many liaison 
devices and a change from action planning to performance control would be particularly important 
here. These same changes would enable broader DOI as well. In addition to the cross-ship 
communications suggested above (e.g., Lieutenant-to-Lieutenant), the task force participants could 
establish rich means of communication, observation and interaction with the non-allied organizations. 
Indeed, with access and discussions restricted to UAS operations, the various participants may benefit 
by exchanging liaison officers across ships. This would decrease formalization levels, as all UAS 
participants begin this new organizational approach, and it would highlight the need for additional 
training (e.g., in Russian and Chinese language) and indoctrination (e.g., working closely with potentially 
low-trust “partners”), in addition to a notable shift from advance planning to ongoing situation 
monitoring as means of control. Further, it would probably make sense to distribute abundantly the 
information pertaining to aircraft operations (e.g., share ATOs and UAV sensor feeds). Notice, again, 
we’re not discussing an extension of interactions and shared information about all operations; rather, 
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we’re focused solely on patterns of interaction and distribution of information pertaining to UAS 
organization and C2. 
The shift from action planning to performance control will require considerable mutual adjustment 
between participants, and coordination loads will exponentiate accordingly. Each organization may 
continue to produce and even share its (action planning) ATOs, for instance, but there are bound to be 
many conflicts. When multiple participants’ UAVs become dense within a given airspace, the 
corresponding crews will need to maintain real-time situational awareness (to the extent supported by 
technology), adjust to potential airspace-time conflicts as they arise, and seek to synchronize UAV 
operations in flight. Moreover, notice how unit grouping will likely exhibit a shift from functional (esp. 
departments and “J-codes”) to processual (e.g., UAS operations), and people in the middle line across all 
participants’ organizations (e.g., Lieutenants, Chiefs, Mission Coordinators) will probably experience 
increased spans of control. Indeed, all ten of the organization design factors listed in Table 2 above 
should see change, and each of these OD decisions will need to be made in the context of the UAS with 
respect to individual ships, commands, organizations and other local circumstances. This is the essence 
of Step 4. The diverse people, processes, organizations and technologies would appear to regain some 
balance through this archetypical organization (re)design process. 
Step 5 of course involves organizational change to effect the Edge archetype and C2 approach—
pertaining to UAS organization. Of course such change is neither straightforward nor easy. Again, 
however, the immediate alternative is no organization. Over considerable time (and trust development), 
the various multinational participants may seek to establish mechanisms for coordinated or even 
collaborative C2 (e.g., consider the different nations sharing and adjusting—or possibly integrating—
their ATOs with one another), in which case the Edge organization and C2 approach would likely fall out 
of fit; C2 agility would decline, but it would be offset by increases in reliability, efficiency and control. If 
so, then these same five archetypical OD steps can be completed again (OODA), and the multinational, 
multi-organization collective may find itself transitioning to more of a Professional Bureaucracy (e.g., 
where each nation’s ship performs the tasks that it does best) or even Simple Structure (e.g., one 
nation’s organization takes—and is accepted as—the lead).  
In any case, archetypical C2 organization design provides a principled and structured approach to an 
otherwise unwieldy multi-organization problem. It can also help to guide the restoration of C2 balance 
across socio-technical elements of people, process, organization and technology, and it can obviate or 
mitigate the time and risk associated with searching an enormous solution space of OD alternatives. This 
approach is no panacea of course, as it requires OD expertise—which is not part of most military 
officers’ education, training or experiential portfolios—and repeated redesign and change will introduce 
considerable turbulence within the affected organizations—which could potentially detract from 
mission accomplishment itself. Further, this archetypical OD approach is experiencing its own continuing 
development and change at present—as we work to refine the integration of heuristic classification and 
like class-level search techniques with organization design—and many of our long-held OD and C2 
principles will need to be revisited and refined as autonomous systems continue their proliferation 
throughout routine as well as exceptional organizational life. This all makes for an exciting and relatively 
open-ended research agenda, one that can induce whole new conversations between organization 
designers, system engineers, UAS technologists, military commanders and others. Indeed, a major goal 
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